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RELIANCE ON THE LAW OF THE CIRCUIT-
A REQUIEM
WALTER V. SCHAEFER*
For several years now, the notion has prevailed that each of the thir-
teen federal courts of appeals is entitled to determine its own construc-
tion of the federal Constitution, and of federal statutory and common
law, without regard to the construction applied by other courts of ap-
peals, and subject only to review by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The result has been the development of thirteen separate legal
enclaves-exactly what the judicial article of the Constitution of the
United States was intended to abolish. 1
The doctrine of the "law of the circuit" is understandably quite sat-
isfactory to most of the judges of the United States courts of appeals.
Every judge of every court, from justices of the peace on up, would like
to have his decisions reviewed only by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The doctrine has pleased most lawyers, too, because it has re-
sulted in an enormously increased flow of litigation, as the same issue is
relitigated in circuit after circuit. The doctrine has also provided attrac-
tive opportunities for forum-shopping, particularly for repeat litigants
like the federal government and national corporations. For the Supreme
Court of the United States the doctrine affords a pseudo-justification for
deferring decisions on difficult issues while conflicting opinions accumu-
late in the courts of appeals. 2 And for the ordinary citizen the doctrine
has provided a high degree of assurance that the "law" as pronounced by
the court of appeals of his circuit could be safely relied upon until the
Supreme Court ruled otherwise.
Until recently, one of the assumed benefits of the doctrine of the law
of the circuit was this element of reliability. That supposed advantage
was nullified by the 1984 decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in United States v. Rodgers,3 which apparently destroyed any illu-
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I. The constitutional infirmity of the "Balkanization" created by the "law of the circuit" is
clearly suggested by the recent regional banking decision. There the Court pointed out that regional-
ism, without congressional authorization under the commerce clause of the Constitution, is invalid.
And the goal of article III of the Constitution is uniformity, not regionalism. See Northeast
Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 105 S. Ct. 2545, 2553-54 (1985).
2. This practice is given false legitimacy by calling it "percolation."
3. 104 S. Ct. 1942 (1984).
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sion that the decision of a court of appeals established the law that could
be relied on within that circuit. The Supreme Court stated:
Finally, respondent urges . . . that because the Friedman [v. United
States] case has been on the books in the Eighth Circuit for a number
of years a contrary decision by this Court should not be applied retro-
actively to him. . . . And any argument by respondent against retro-
active application to him of our present decision, even if he could
establish reliance upon the earlier Friedman decision, would be un-
availing since the existence of conflicting cases from other courts of
appeals made review of that issue by this Court and decision against
the position of the respondent reasonably foreseeable.4
In other words, no one has any right to rely on a federal circuit court of
appeals decision in ordering his affairs. Not only does the reliability of a
court of appeals decision vanish in the face of a conflict among the cir-
cuits, but the possibility of a future conflict robs every court of appeals
decision of reliability.
United States v. Rodgers adds an element of urgency to the solution
of the problem of conflicting court of appeals decisions. If, as appears to
be the case, the Supreme Court is to be the sole source of legal doctrine
upon which people can rely, something must be done to reduce the pe-
riod of uncertainty. 5 Yet most of the proposed solutions to the problems
created by circuit conflicts would prolong the uncertainty by interposing
an additional tier of appellate review between the courts of appeals and
the Supreme Court. This is true of the Freund6 and Hruska 7 proposals,
the proposal currently being advocated by Chief Justice Burger,8 as well
4. Id. at 1948-49 (citing Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967)). The opin-
ion's penultimate paragraph, from which this quotation is taken, consisted of three sentences. The
first sentence stated both of the two final contentions advanced by Rodgers. The second sentence
disposed of one of these contentions, that the "rule of lenity" in construing criminal statutes should
be applied in his favor. The last sentence disposed of the contention that the statute should not be
applied retroactively to him. The first omission in the excerpted quotation concerns the lenity con-
tention, and the second concerns the disposition of the lenity issue.
5. As the Supreme Court recently pointed out, in Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1947 n.34
(1985), a case construing a statute of limitations:
On a human level, uncertainty is costly to all parties. Plaintiffs may be denied their just
remedy if they delay in filing their claims, having wrongly postulated that the courts would
apply a longer statute. Defendants cannot calculate their contingent liabilities, not know-
ing with confidence when their delicts lie in repose.
6. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT, 57 F.R.D. 573, 590, 611 (1972). The Study Group is popularly known as the
Freund Commission, after its chairman, Professor Paul A. Freund.
7. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195, 199, 208 (1975).
The Commission is popularly known as the Hruska Commission, after its chairman, Senator Roman
L. Hruska.
8. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 447 (1983).
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as two proposals9 that have approached the problem from the perspective
of citizens, who are consumers of legal doctrine, rather than from the
institutional perspective of judicial administration.
Two suggestions, if adopted by the Supreme Court, would contrib-
ute substantially to the reduction of the volume of litigation and address
the problem raised by Rodgers. The first is to eliminate the practice of
that Court in putting off the determination of whether its decision an-
nouncing a new legal doctrine, or overruling an existing precedent, is to
operate prospectively or retroactively. The propriety of limiting the ef-
fect of a judicial decision to events that take place after the decision has
been formally recognized since Justice Cardozo's decision in Great
Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co., 10 in 1932. Commen-
tators have long agreed that the determination of prospective or retroac-
tive operation should be made in the decision announcing the new rule:
Inconsistency between an overruling decision and subsequent cases
may be eliminated if the problem is faced when the overruling case is
before the court. At that time the court must consider whether the
reasons in favor of overruling justify whatever confusion and hardship
may be expected to result in future cases from reliance on the prece-
dents. If the seriousness of the error is deemed to warrant an overrul-
ing notwithstanding probable hardship to present and future litigants,
the overruling decision should become law for any subsequent case.II
The late Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor said that he perceived nonretro-
active rulings as presenting two concomitant but distinct issues:
First, should there be a new rule? If so, the second issue would be
whether to apply the new rule retroactively. Since the issue of retroac-
tivity turns on reliance, a party who may have significantly relied on
the overruled precedent is very differently situated from parties in the
future who will have no comparable basis for reliance.12
Sometimes the Supreme Court has done so, as it did in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 13 decided in 1982.
There the Court said: "Having concluded that the broad grant of juris-
diction to the bankruptcy courts . . . is unconstitutional, we must now
determine whether our holding should be applied retroactively to the ef-
9. See Coleman, The Supreme Court of the United States: Managing its Caseload to Achieve its
Constitutional Purposes, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1983); Thompson, Increasing Uniformity
and Capacity in the Federal Appellate System, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 493-94 (1984).
10. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
11. Note, The Effect of Overruled and Overruling Decisions on Intervening Transactions, 47
HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1413 (1934) (citations omitted).
12. Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections on Leeways and Limits of Appellate Courts, 1980 UTAH
L. REV. 255, 269; see also Schaefer, Prospective Rulings: Two Perspectives, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 21-
22.
13. 458 U.S. 50, 87-88 (1982).
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fective date of the Act."1 4 Relying on Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 15 the
Court held that its decision should apply only prospectively. 16 Too
often, however, the Supreme Court fails to determine retroactivity or
prospectivity in its law-changing decision, and instead allows that issue
"to fester" in the lower courts until finally the Supreme Court reaches it
years later.1 7
The needless litigation that is generated by putting off the determi-
nation of retroactivity is illustrated by a recent case in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.,, The issue was the
retroactivity of Wilson v. Garcia, 19 which announced a new rule gov-
erning the period of limitations for section 1983 actions filed in federal
courts, but did not decide the retroactivity issue. Judge Bernard M.
Decker was confronted on the one hand with the settled rule of the Sev-
enth Circuit,20 and on the other with the new, and different, rule an-
nounced in Wilson v. Garcia. He pointed out that conflicts as to the
retroactivity of Wilson v. Garcia had already developed in the three
months since the Court announced Wilson v. Garcia.21 He ruled in favor
of prospectivity, persuaded by the circuit precedent and the inequity of a
retroactive result.22 Judge Decker disposed of United States v. Rodgers
on the ground that earlier decisions23 had ruled in favor of prospectiv-
ity.24 He then certified the case for appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. 25
If the Supreme Court would consistently decide at once the question
of prospectivity or retroactivity as it did in the Northern Pipeline case,
the remaining conflicts, resulting from conflicting constructions of con-
stitutional or statutory provisions, could be eliminated promptly by
adopting a second suggestion, which does not require legislation and in-
volves only a modest exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory juris-
14. Id. at 87 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
15. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
16. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 88.
17. The phrase "to fester" comes from Beytagh, Ten Years ofNon-retroactivity: A Critique and
a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1588 (1975).
18. Moore v. Floro, 614 F. Supp. 328 (N.D. II1. 1985).
19. 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1949 (1985).
20. Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 338 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
21. Moore v. Floro, 614 F. Supp. 328, 331 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (citing Smith v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 764 F.2d 188, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1985); Winston v. Sanders, 610 F. Supp. 176, 179 (C.D. Ill.
1985)).
22. Moore v. Floro, 614 F. Supp. 328, 331-34 (N.D. Il1. 1985).
23. Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (1984); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson. 404 U.S. 97.
107-09 (1971). Neither of these decisions involved a conflict among federal courts of appeals.
24. Moore v. Floro, 614 F. Supp. 328, 333 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
25. Moore v. Floro. No. 84 C 10824 (N.D. III. Aug. 5. 1985) (order granting motion to certify
for interlocutory appeal).
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diction.26 As I have discussed more fully elsewhere:
By rule and decision the Supreme Court could require procedures that
would sharply reduce the conflicts and increase the uniformity of na-
tional law. A Supreme Court rule could provide that the first panel
decision of a court of appeals would establish the proposition for all of
the courts of appeals, just as it now does for all subsequent three-judge
panels within the circuit and for all of the district courts within the
circuit. That decision would remain controlling until it is overruled en
banc by a court of appeals, either of that or another circuit. That en
banc decision would control until overruled by the Supreme Court.27
Citizens throughout the nation, regardless of circuit boundaries, would
be entitled to rely on each of these decisions while it was in effect.
26. The Supreme Court has freely exercised its supervisory jurisdiction since at least as far back
as McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) ("Judicial supervision of the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized stan-
dards of procedure and evidence.").
27. Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. J. 452, 455 (1983).
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